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INTRODUCTION
Issues faced by those in the sexual minority' are at the forefront of
controversial topics dividing much of the United States. Whether
homosexuals are to be given the same civil rights with respect to mar-
riage as heterosexuals, the military, and even complete equality in the
eyes of the anti-discrimination statutes is still heavily debated. Al-
though there have been notable victories in the battle for homosex-
ual protection, complete equality is still dauntingly distant.2 In light
of the controversy facing civil rights for homosexuals, it is no surprise
that the problems faced by transgender 3 individuals are given even
less prominence in the media and the political milieu. Yet this is rap-
idly changing, and as the nation is recognizing that sexuality cannot
be easily compartmentalized, the media and progressive municipali-
ties are becoming more cognizant of the needs of transgender indi-
viduals.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2003, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professors Eric A. Tilles and Kermit Roosevelt for their
thoughtful and very much appreciated critiques of earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the
board members of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their unwavering
support in the publication process.
"Sexual minority," for lack of a more effective universal identifier, will be used to identify
those individuals who do not conform to conventional gender norms in so much as they either
do not identify with the biological gender with which they were born, or because they are at-
tracted to those of the same biological gender. I realize that this term may offend those who
consider themselves among the "gender majority" or may even resent the implication of being
in the minority, and apologize for using this admittedly ambiguous short-hand.
2 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that same-sex intimate
relationships are a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while declining to consider whether governmental recognition of same-sex relationships
was protected); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 728 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that
sexual orientation is a suspect classification), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957, 957 (1990).
See Part I infra for a discussion of what is generally meant by "transgender" and "gender
identity."
' See SHANNON MINTER & CHRISTOPHER DALEY, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS & THE
TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., TRANS REALITIES: A LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF SAN FRANCISCO'S
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Transgender individuals have made remarkable efforts to lobby
for civil rights laws in the past decade.' "[T]hese efforts have been
most successful at the local level."6 "In 1975, Minneapolis, Minnesota
passed the first local ordinance prohibiting discrimination against
transgender people., 7 By the end of 2006, the number of local ordi-
nances protecting transgender people had multiplied. There are
now at least eighty-four such local ordinances."
Bathroom access is one of the most critical issues faced by the
transgender community. Undeniably, the issue is often perceived as
frivolous, but undeservingly so.9 This perception is particularly trou-
blesome as the courts will likely be the stage for the battle over bath-
room access since legislatures are reluctant to declare that the denial
of bathroom access based on gender identity is discrimination, and
few jurisdictions have agencies willing to draft appropriate statutory
guidelines like the ones in San Francisco and New York City.1°
This Comment argues that bathroom access based on gender
identity is indeed a vital right for the transgender community, and
one deserving of public as well as legislative attention. Transgender
individuals should not be compelled to use the bathrooms designated
TRANSGENDER COMMUNITIES 3 (2003), http://nclrights.org/publications/pubs/
transrealities0803.pdf (highlighting the advancements made with respect to transgender issues
in both the legal and social arenas).
See Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judi-
cial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 37, 45 (2000) (de-
lineating the recent successes of the movement for transgender rights).
6 Id.
Id. (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, § 139.20 (2000)).
Some of the municipalities that have enacted some type of transgender-protective anti-
discrimination regulation are: Ann Arbor, Michigan; Atlanta, Georgia; Benton County, Ore-
gon; Boulder, Colorado; Cambridge, Massachusetts; DeKalb, Illinois; Evanston, Illinois; Grand
Rapids, Michigan; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Iowa City, Iowa; Jefferson County, Kentucky; Lou-
.isville, Kentucky; Los Angeles, California; Madison, Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New
York City, New York; New Orleans, Louisiana; Olympia, Washington; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
Portland, Oregon; San Francisco, California; Seattle, Washington; St. Paul, Minnesota; Toledo,
Ohio; Tucson, Arizona; West Hollywood, California. For an updated list of jurisdictions with
transgender-protective laws, see Transgender Law & Policy Inst., Non-Discrimination Laws That
Include Gender Identity and Expression, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/
index.htm#jurisdictions (last visited Nov. 15, 2006). See Part V, infra, for a description of the
San Francisco and New York City ordinances as they serve as particularly useful models for ef-
fective transgender-inclusive anti-discrimination laws.
9 As stated by Lisa Mottet, there is concern that "courts will view denial of bathroom access
as just a minor inconvenience that they do not want to micromanage. This was apparent in
Coins. The court wanted to defer to the employer's handling of these issues and so it hid be-
hind a vague notion of cultural practices instead of applying the law." Lisa Mottet, Transgender
Civil Rights Project, Speech at Georgetown Symposium on Gender & Sexuality (Feb. 27, 2002),
in Access to Gender-Appropriate Bathroonu: A Frustrating Diversion on the Path to Transgender Equality,
4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 739, 744 (2003) (citing Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.
2001)).
10 See id.
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for their biological gender, nor should proprietors of public accom-
modations and employers be forced to provide gender neutral bath-
rooms or a restroom reserved for the "other" group, as such designa-
tions only perpetuate gender stereotypes and discriminatory
behavior. Although the Comment urges attention to this issue at the
national level, such groundbreaking statutory protection is unlikely.
This Comment therefore proposes that reform begin with legislation
drafted at the local level, and modeled after the regulatory guidelines
passed in New York City and San Francisco.
Part I of the Comment details the technical definition(s) of what
constitutes being transgender under current medical and psychologi-
cal guidelines. Part II describes the place the transgender commu-
nity holds within the constitutional framework with respect to equal
protection. The section concludes that the transgender community
should be considered a suspect class due to the immutability of gen-
der identity and the history of discrimination faced by this group, but
highlights that statutory protection, particularly at the local level, is
even more urgent given that the United States Supreme Court is
unlikely to bestow suspect class status on the transgender community.
Part III details the history of the battle for equal rights by transgender
individuals, both at the state and federal levels. The section also ex-
plains that while the transgender community is not considered a sus-
pect class for purposes of federal statutory protection, such as Title
VII, significant headway is being made in both state legislation and
common law with respect to transgender rights. Part IV details the
importance of bathroom access based on gender identity due to the
safety, comfort, and individual liberty implications of not permitting
such access to the transgender community. This part notes that de-
spite the undeniable importance of bathroom access, it is the next
frontier of equality for transgender individuals in that when decisions
concerned bathroom access for preoperative transsexuals, both state
and federal courts have denied protection. Finally, in light of the
evident judicial reluctance to protect transgender rights, Part V re-
views the success of the New York and San Francisco ordinances, and
considers them as possible models for other municipal legislation
which may ultimately pave the road to protection at the national
level. This section concludes with a proposal for reform advocating
restroom access based on gender identity.
I. WHAT IS TRANSGENDER?
The term "transgender" applies to a variety of psychological and
physiological states, and it is thus difficult to create an all-
Feb. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
encompassing definition for transgender individuals. The concept is
closely tied to one's "gender identity," a phrase coined by John
Money, a psychologist and sexologist at Johns Hopkins University."
Money was the first to describe the term "gender role" as the "same-
ness, unity and persistence of one's individuality as male, female, or
ambivalent, in greater or lesser degree, especially as it is experienced
in self-awareness and behavior.' 2  According to most sexuality ex-
perts, gender identity is the private experience of gender role, and
gender role is the public expression of gender identity. Gender role
is defined as everything that a person says and does to indicate to
others, or to the self, the degree that one is either male, female, or
ambivalent.
3
According to recent medical theory, transsexual, also referred to
as "transgender," individuals are clinically diagnosed with Gender
Identity Disorder. 4  The section of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) entitled "Gender Identity Disor-
ders" was replaced with the singular term "Gender Identity Disorder"
(GID), upon the release of the DSM-IV, and the term "transsexual-
ism" was eliminated."' Most important is that GID was reclassified as
being a sexual disorder rather than a psychological one.16
Transsexualism, or being transgender, can be described as an in-
congruence between one's biological sexual differentiation and one's
gender identity. 7 The criteria of the DSM-IV are often used to diag-
" See SUZANNEJ. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 6 (1998) (describing the origins
of the term "gender identity," and explaining that "[v]irtually all academic writing on sex and
gender refers to a case first described by sexologistJohn Money in 1972").
12 Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should Phy-
sicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH... GENDER & L.
1, 17 n.71 (citing KESSLER, supra note 11, at 6-7, 13-14, and discussing the theory of gender
proposed first by John Money, _. G. Hampson, and J. L. Hampson in 1955 and developed in
1972 by Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt that "gender identity is changeable until approximately
eighteen months of age").
" See Anne Vitale, Notes on Gender Role Transition: Rethinking the Gender Identity Disorder Termi-
nology in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (2005),
http://www.avitale.com/hbigdatalkplus2005.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (defining gender
role).
14 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (discussing the criteria for diagnosing patients
with Gender Identity Disorder).
'5 See generally id. (employing the revised terminology).
16 See Vitale, supra note 13 (arguing against the latter classification because much of an indi-
vidual's gender identity may depend on biological factors outside of the individual's control).
7 This should be contrasted from transvestitism, which is a desire to dress and express one-
self as the opposite sex, but has no direct relationship to an ingrained desire to identify with
and become the opposite sex. Essentially, transvestitism is more a mental fetish than a physical
incongruity. HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON § 3 (Symposion 1999) (1966),
available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/benjamin/index.htm.
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nose GID, and thus clinically label an individual as transgender 8
The Harry Benjamin Standards of Care describes the DSM-IV di-
agnosis of GID as "[a] strong and persistent cross-gender identifica-
tion and a persistent discomfort with [one's] sex or a sense of inap-
propriateness in [one's] gender role of that sex[.] [Such a condition
should be] diagnosed [as] Gender Identity Disorder ..
There has also been at least one instance in which a court recog-
nized GID as a legitimate psychological disorder requiring the provi-
sion of public health care. In 1980, the Eighth Circuit overturned
Iowa's statutory ban on Medicaid coverage for gender-related surger-
ies on the grounds that it removed treatment decisions from claim-
ants' physicians, and gave the government the sole authority to de-
termine appropriate treatment for GID.2°
The Supreme Court's definition notably employs the Gender
Identity Disorder framework of transgenderism. The Court adopted
its own definition of a transsexual in Farmer v. Brennan as "one who
has '[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently
uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who typically
seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to
bring about a permanent sex change.
Undeniably, considering transgenderism as a disorder may more
easily facilitate protection for this group. However, some transgender
advocates reject the conception of transsexualism as a disorder, be-
cause they believe it labels their lifestyle as diseased.2  Moreover,
many transsexuals reject being identified as "transgender" for nu-
merous other reasons.23 However, a unifying identifier may serve to
benefit, rather than hinder, the fight for equality by facilitating a
S These criteria are: (1) there must be evidence of a strong and persistent cross-gender
identification; (2) this cross-gender identification must not merely be a desire for any perceived
cultural advantages of being the other sex; (3) there must also be evidence of persistent discom-
fort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex; (4)
the individual must not have a concurrent physical intersex condition (e.g., androgen insensi-
tivity syndrome or congenital adrenal hyperplasia); and (5) there must be evidence of clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of function-
ing. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 537.
"HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS'N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER
IDENTITY DISORDERS 4 (6th ed. 2001).
See Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980).
' 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006
(1989)).
In See generally LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 1-79 (1998) (re-
counting the stories of transgendered people who have sought equality).
" One argument is that the use of the umbrella term causes the individual's identity and
history to be marginalized. Another is that the term implies lack of gender barriers, whereas
transsexual people themselves identify as men or as women. A third argument is that trans-
gender individuals did not modify their gender at any point, and they have always had their
gender identity, but only experienced physiological problems, and it is the latter which they
desire to change.
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common bond between certain individuals in the sexual minority and
fostering recognition of the unique needs and concerns of this com-
munity. By attempting to categorize at least some of the characteris-
tics of the transgender individual, the psychological community has
permitted a more accessible understanding of what it means to be
transsexual and provided a touchstone for solidarity among the
transgender community and their supporters, which is crucial to
wage a successful battle for equality.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR TRANSGENDER PROTECTION
A. Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.24
The Supreme Court has interpreted the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment to provide for the equal treatment of all citizens, par-
ticularly those in the minority or meeting the criteria of a suspect
class.25
An important impetus for the grant of equal rights for all indi-
viduals was the recognition that one holds national citizenship in ad-
dition to one's state citizenship, and thus cannot be denied due
process and equal protection by one's state. 6 The Supreme Court
thereby recognized the necessity of protecting the liberties of indi-
viduals and groups from intrusion by the states.
Despite the recognition that all citizens deserve the protection of
their "privileges and immunities," the Court has applied variable cri-
teria for determining whether unconstitutional discrimination ex-
isted with respect to distinct groups. For example, discrimination
based on race and alienage is subject to strict scrutiny where only dis-
crimination that is necessary to achieve a compelling governmentjus-
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
, See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (holding that discrimination
based on gender must meet "exceedingly persuasive" justification to survive validity under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) ("The central purpose of the... Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of offi-
cial conduct discriminating on the basis of race.").
'6 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37-38 (1872) (acknowledging for
the first time that individuals may be citizens of the United States without regard to their state
citizenship).
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tification is constitutionally acceptable. However, only "heightened
scrutiny" is necessary to pass constitutional muster for purposes of
discrimination based on gender.2 7 The Court has also been reluctant
to recognize a broader definition of gender for purposes of categoriz-
ing sexual minorities within the heightened protection granted un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
deemed that homosexual relationships were only protected by the
minimal rational basis standard of review.28 Thus, the rights of homo-
sexuals as a group were not deemed to be worthy of the heightened
standard of review granted to women and men when they are dis-
criminated against because of their biological gender. 9
Although gender is notably a discrete biological category for pur-
poses of constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, transgender individuals as a group have an argument for such
protection. The Supreme Court's equal protection analysis has fo-
cused on the immutability of discrimination-inducing traits. One of
the factors leading to its denial of suspect class status for homosexuals
was the Court's focus on the behavioral aspect of discrimination
against this group. Indeed the statute struck down in Lawrence was
one that dealt with homosexual sodomy, and did not categorically
deny rights to homosexual men as a group.30 The soundness of this
distinction is undoubtedly open to debate. However, the transgender
community does not succumb to this pitfall for purposes of equal
protection because such individuals do not belong to the "trans-
gender" group by virtue of their behavior, but rather identify as
transgender due to a physical or psychological immutable trait that is
associated with Gender Identity Disorder. Thus the transgendered
meet the criteria of a protected class for purposes of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
31
27 Compare Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) ("[A]lI laws that classify citizens on
the basis of race.., are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized."), with Virginia,
518 U.S. at 533 (holding that discrimination based on gender must meet "exceedingly persua-
sive" justification and " [t ] he State must show 'at least that the.., classification serves "impor-
tant governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives"'") (citations omitted).
539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (describing heightened scrutiny for gender-based classifica-
tions). The Court has, however, recognized that same-sex sexual harassment is a violation of
Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that
same-sex sexual harassment claims are actionable under Title VII).
o Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75 (declining to employ an equal protection rationale so as to
address sexual relations generally and not homosexual sodomy in particular).
" It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court is not likely to recognize the trans-
gendered as a suspect class, especially in light of its recent unwillingness to recognize new sus-
pect classes. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985)
(holding that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class and thus a zoning ordinance
barring an assisted living center for such individuals was not subject to strict scrutiny).
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B. Transgender as a Suspect Class
Transgender individuals are a suspect class in light of the history
of discrimination against such individuals and the immutability of
their gender identity.3 2  The Court in Erontiero v. Richardson empha-
sized that the immutability of a trait is determined largely by whether
it is an "accident of birth" and thus is virtually impossible to change.
33
In so much as a physiological disorder can be considered inherited or
unchangeable, albeit treatable, the GID classification bestowed on
the transgendered designates transgenderism as an immutable trait.
34
Indeed, the federal courts have acknowledged the immutable quality
of gender identity because it constitutes a physiological or psycho-
logical condition. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
concluded that transsexualism is a serious medical and psychological
problem that constitutes a serious medical need. Likewise, several
courts have held that transsexual inmates have a constitutional right
to some type of medical treatment.
36
" See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (describing four criteria for sus-
pect class status: historical discrimination, immutability, political powerlessness, and disparate
treatment not based on actual ability).
" Id. at 686. Some may argue that the ability to change one's gender belies the fact that the
condition is not immutable. This criticism is misplaced, however, because the condition of not
identifying with one's own biological gender is not alterable.
See Kari Balog, Note, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability Argument is Neces-
sary and How it is Met, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 545, 556-57 (2005) (discussing the Court's emphasis
on a group's inability to change a trait as an indicator of immutability and implying that the
heredity of a trait may be of utmost importance in the analysis).
' See, e.g., Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a transgender
prisoner stated a cause of action for deprivation of medical treatment when prison officials
failed to provide treatment for gender dysphoria); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir.
1988) (stating that transsexualism is a psychological disorder that constitutes a "serious medical
need"); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the transsexual
inmate stated a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment for the denial of medical treatment
for her transsexualism); see also Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 799-801 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (determining that the transsexual plaintiff had a right to receive the same standard
of care she received prior to incarceration, i.e., hormone therapy, because "transsexualism is
not voluntarily assumed and is not merely a matter of sexual preference" and that the inmate
suffered from "serious medical need").
'6 See, e.g., Zavaras, 63 F.3d at 970 (holding that a transgender prisoner stated a cause of ac-
tion for deprivation of medical treatment under the Eighth Amendment and was entitled to a
general right to medical treatment); Faulkner, 821 F.2d at 413 (holding that a transsexual in-
mate stated a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment in connection with denial of medical
treatment for transsexualism, "which if proven, would entitle her to some kind of medical treat-
ment"). But see Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986) (holding that a transgender
prisoner did not have a constitutional right to preoperative hormone therapy or a sex change
operation); Rush v..johnson, 565 F. Supp. 856, 869 (D. Ga. 1985) (denying Medicaid reim-
bursement for sex change surgery because the court "found reasonable the State's determina-
tion that transsexual surgery is not generally accepted by the professional medical community
as a proven and effective treatment for the condition for which it is being used and that there is
no authoritative evidence that the surgery is safe and effective. Thus, the State's determination
[Vol. 9:3
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The transgender community is also a demonstrable suspect class
because of the history of disparate treatment the group has suffered s7
As Dylan Vade points out, "[t]ransgender people are discriminated
against in many areas of life, from employment and housing, to
health care and custody rights.,3s The Human Rights Commission of
San Francisco reported that seventy percent of self-identified trans-
gender respondents in San Francisco were unemployed.3 9  The
Transgender Law Center and the National Center for Lesbian Rights
joint study on "Trans Realities" found that sixty-four percent of survey
respondents reported annual incomes of $25,000 or less.40 In Wash-
ington, D.C., forty-two percent of the transgender survey respondents
were unemployed, and thirty-one percent reported an annual income
of less than $10,000 per year.
Furthermore, as Franklin Romeo explains:
[T]ransgender people are disproportionately affected by poverty and
frequently rely upon public assistance programs such as welfare, Medi-
caid, and foster care. Additionally, the combination of poverty and em-
ployment discrimination leads to a disproportionate number of trans-
gender people participating in criminalized economies; therefore,
gender nonconforming people are also disproportionately represented
in the criminal justice system, court-mandated treatment programs, and
42prisons.
California is the only state that protects transgender and gender
minority students from discrimination and harassment.43 There are
that medically necessary services do not include [such] surgery... withstands judicial scru-
tiny.").
3' See generally MINTER & DALEY, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting a survey in which "the people
who completed the survey face an array of legal challenges in expressing their gender identity
due to bias and ignorance regarding transgender issues").
Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptu-
alization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 257
(2005).
" PATRICK LETELLIER & YOSENIO V. LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N CITY & COUNTY OF S.F.,
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT FOR THE LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL TRANSCENDER COMMUNITIES 10
(2000), http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/docs/econ.pdf.
'o MINTER & DALEY, supra note 4, at 13.
JESSICA M. XAVIER, THE WASHINGTON TRANSGENDER NEEDS ASSESSMENT SURVEY (2000),
http://www.glaa.org/archive/2000/tgneedsassessmentl 112.shtml.
12 Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Iden-
tity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 714-15 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
" See Assemb. B. 537, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 200
(2000)) ("It is the policy of the State of California to afford all persons, regardless of their sex,
ethnic group identification, race, national origin, religion, mental or physical disability, or re-
gardless of any basis that is contained in the prohibition of hate crimes set forth in subdivision
(a) of Section 422.6 of the Penal Code, equal rights and opportunities in the postsecondary in-
stitutions of the state.").
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currently no laws that protect transgender people from discrimina-
tion in health care.4
In light of the overwhelming discrimination the transgender
community faces, some scholars have recommended treating trans-
gender individuals as a separate "gender-identity" protected class.45
However, only Rhode Island recognizes "gender-identity and expres-
sion" as a discrete and unique protected class." Indeed, many states
have explicitly denied suspect class status to the transgender commu-
nity.
However, the psychological community's recent treatment of
transgenderism as a physiological disorder, as opposed to merely a
mental illness, indicates that transgenderism is an immutable trait.
48
People suffering from GID experience great discomfort regarding
their assigned gender. Moreover, the diagnostic criteria for GID
generally includes an ongoing desire since early childhood to be the
"opposite" gender, a desire for a physical change in one's body, and a
heterosexual desire in the gender with which one iden ies.49  "In-
creasingly, as the medical regulation of gender transitions has be-
come more uniform and visible, courts have been willing to grant at
least rudimentary legal protections to transgender litigants who are
able to provide documentation of a GID diagnosis and related medi-
cal treatment."
50
Given the consideration that the Supreme Court is unlikely to be-
stow suspect class status on the transgendered, if for no other reason
than the fact that it has expressed its disinclination to create new sus-
44 See Vade, supra note 38, at 260 (discussing the dearth of transgender-protective laws in
healthcare and employment).
45 See, e.g., Samantha J. Levy, Comment, Trans-Forming Notions of Equal Protection: The Gender
Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 141, 167-68 (2002) (discussing the three main
benefits of conceptualizing transsexual individuals as part of a "gender-identity class," including
providing broad protection for all transgender people, attacking the discrimination that is cur-
rently happening, and educating society about the existence of a transgender population).
"6 H.R. 5920A, 2001 Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2001).
41 See, e.g., Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
"[i] t is also not clear that Mario, as a transsexual, is a member of a protected class" while hold-
ing that even if P & C denied Mario benefits based on discrimination, gender reassignment sur-
gery is not covered by the employer's medical insurance or ERISA because it is not medically
necessary); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995) (deciding that transsexuals are
not a protected class and thus discrimination against them merits only rational basis review);
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3 (D. Utah June 24,
2005) ("Transsexuals are clearly not a protected class under Title VII."); Rush v. johnson, 565 F.
Supp. 856, 868 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (denying that transsexuals are a protected class).
41 See generally DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 532-33 (referring to cross-gender identification and
continual discomfort in one's assigned sex as "Gender Identity Disorder").
4' Id. at 532-38 (describing early childhood behaviors of those with Gender Identity Disor-
der, including the manifestation of a desire to alter their bodies, and a later desire to adopt the
social role and physical appearance of a member of the opposite sex).
' Romeo, supra note 42, at 726.
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pect classes,5 a call for statutory protection at local and state levels is
even more necessary to make the needed headway in the battle for
transgender equality. It is undeniable, however, that the conception
of the transgender community as a suspect class would not only high-
light the need for protective equal rights legislation for this group,
and thereby facilitate the passage of such legislation, but would also
enable judicial stringency in combating discrimination against trans-
gender individuals in various contexts.
III. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE BATTLE FOR
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS
A. Transgender-Protective Developments at the Federal Level
Federal courts are more willing to provide protection for trans-
gender individuals than in the past. However, federal statutory au-
thority is still overwhelmingly unfavorable toward transgender rights.
Accordingly, a great number of federal decisions reviewing Title VII's
express applicability to transsexuals have denied the statute's protec-
tion." The same reluctance to extend federal statutory protection to
transsexuals has also been exhibited with respect to ERISA coverage
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court in Etsitty
51 See supra note 31.
52 See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[H]arassment
based solely upon a person's sexual preference or orientation (and not on one's sex) is not an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII."); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that "Title VII does not protect transsexuals"); Sommers v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding that the word "sex" in Title
VII's ban on sex discrimination in the employment context is to be given its plain meaning,
which does not include discrimination against transsexuals); Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz,
Inc., 636 F.2d 1047, 1050-51 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981) (denying Title VII protection to a pre-
operative transsexual after determining that the plaintiff, who was male at the time of the com-
plaint, was fired for dressing like a woman in violation of the employee dress code, not because
of her gender identity); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that Title VII does not protect transsexuals against discrimination because it only bars
discrimination based on "sex," and not "gender"); Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3 ("Transsexu-
als are clearly not a protected class under Title VII."); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
2d 996, 999 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aftd, No. 03-3344, 2004 WL 1166553 (6th Cir. May 18, 2004)
(holding that an employer's requirement that a transsexual employee use the men's restrooms
did not constitute sex stereotyping discrimination under Title VII since the requirement only
made the employee comply with the accepted principles established for gender-distinct public
restrooms); Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WAL 21525058, at *3
(S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) ("Sweet's intent to change his sex does not support a claim of sex dis-
crimination under Title VII because that intended behavior did not place him within the class
of persons protected under Title VII from discrimination based on sex."); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that Tide VII does not pro-
tect against discrimination based on transsexualism).
", See, e.g.,Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 999, aff'd, No. 03-3344, 2004 WL 1166553 (6th Cir. May
18, 2004) (holding that discharging a transsexual plaintiff for refusing to use the men's rest-
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v. Utah Transit Authority delineated the common rationale for denying
extending such protection to the transgender community. It held
that "transsexuals are clearly not a protected class under Tide VII,
'5 4
and relied primarily on the rationale set forth in Ulane v. Eastern Air-
lines, which states that
[T]o include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII far exceeds mere
statutory interpretation. Congress had a narrow view of sex in mind
when it passed the Civil Rights Act, and it has rejected subsequent at-
tempts to broaden the scope of its original interpretation. For us to now
hold that Title VII protects transsexuals would take us out of the realm of
interpreting and reviewing and into the realm of legislating....
... [I]f the term 'sex' as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than
biological male or biological female, the new definition must come from
55
Congress.
Although there has been a trend among both state and federal
courts to acknowledge that gender discrimination might surpass the
mere protection of biological males and females against harassment
and disparate treatment, the same courts have also been reluctant to
acknowledge federal statutory protection for transgender individu-
als. 6
This reluctance to designate transgender individuals as a pro-
tected class is not surprising. Federal jurisprudence has traditionally
been hostile to recognizing transgender individuals as a protected
class for purposes of protecting their civil rights. The hallmark deci-
sion denying such protection emerged in 1977, when the court in
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. denied Title VII protection for57
transsexuals. The court reasoned that Title VII does not extend to
transsexuals because it only bars discrimination based on "sex," not
room did not violate Title VII or the ADA); Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the employer's medical insurance or ERISA does not cover gender
reassignment surgery because such surgery is not medically necessary); James v. Ranch Mart
Hardware, Inc., No. 94-2235-KHV, 1994 WL 731517, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 1994) (holding that
employment discrimination based on transsexualism is not actionable under Title VII or the
ADA).
Etsitty, 2005 WL 1505610, at *3.
Id. at *3-4 (quoting Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086-87).
See, e.g., Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL
22757935, at *4-5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that the plaintiffs claim under Title VII
for discrimination for failing to act like a man was discrimination based on sex and therefore
actionable under Title VII, while acknowledging that if the discrimination complaint centered
on discrimination based on the plaintiffs transsexuality she would not have been protected, as
Title VII does not protect transgender individuals); Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 98-
4254CVCSOWECF, 2000 WL 1585257, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000) (finding that discrimina-
tion based on sexual stereotypes is impermissible, but questioning whether a transsexual is pro-
tected from sex discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII).
17 566 F.2d at 663.
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transsexualism.8 It further stated that Congress intended to preserve
protection from discrimination based on the traditional definition of
"sex," which means either male or female for purposes of Title VII. 9
Another preeminent decision emerged in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.60 The court expressly disagreed with the trial court's holding that
transsexuals, as individuals with Gender Identity Disorder and not
simply homosexuals or transvestites, are to be protected under Title
VII. The court held that Title VII does not protect transsexuals
since "words should be given their ordinary, common meaning" and
"sex," with respect to Title VII, meant anatomical gender.6 Thus Ti-
de VII, according to the court, does not extend protections to groups
such as homosexuals and transsexuals. Moreover the court found
that Congress manifested an intention to exclude homosexuals from
Title VII coverage and did not mean to include broad protection for
63individuals with GID. Unlike Holloway, which the Ninth Circuit de-
clared overruled, 64 Ulane continues to hold sway as relevant author-
ity.65 Courts have reconciled the tension between Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins and Holloway by generally holding that transgender plaintiffs
are not a suspect class for purposes of Title VII, but Title VII itself
66merely declares impermissible disparate treatment of one sex.
Courts often bypass equality and fairness concerns by either
downplaying the harm to the transgender individual or by minimiz-
ing the effort necessary on the part of such individuals to conform to
traditional societal gender roles.67  For example, the court in Etsitty
Id. at 664 ("Holloway has not claimed to have [been] treated discriminatorily because she
is male or female, but rather because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex.").
Id. at 663 ("Congress has not shown any intent other than to restrict the term 'sex' to its
traditional meaning.").
0 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
61 Id. at 1085 ("While we recognize distinctions among homosexuals, transvestites, and trans-
sexuals, we believe that the same reasons for holding that the first two groups do not enjoy Title
VII coverage apply with equal force to deny protection for transsexuals.").
62 id.
63 Id.
The court in Schwenk v. Hartford 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000), recognized the Hol-
loway decision as overruled by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See infra notes
84-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (following the
Ulane court's reasoning that "Congress intended the term 'sex' to mean 'biological male or bio-
logical female,' and not one's sexuality or sexual orientation"); Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran
Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at *2-4 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) (relying on
Ulane in holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person's inten-
tion to change his or her sex).
See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *4-5 (D.
Utah June 24, 2005) (deciding that to include transsexuals within the protection of Title VII
would exceed statutory interpretation and that there is a difference between a woman who does
not behave femininely and a man who is altering his appearance to look like a woman).
67 See supra notes 64-65.
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held that an employer's dismissal of a preoperative male-to-female
transsexual was permissible because the employer was not forcing the
plaintiff to change her appearance, but rather to abide by societal de-
lineations of permissible bathroom facilities Elaborating on this
point, the court stated that "[t]here is no evidence that the defen-
dants required Plaintiffs appearance to conform to a particular gen-
der stereotype, only that they required her 'to conform to the ac-
cepted principles established for gender-distinct public restrooms.'
This is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for dismissing her."69
The court also expressly held that the Price Waterhouse prohibition
against sex stereotyping discussed below should not be applied to
transsexuals.
There is a huge difference between a woman who does not behave as
femininely as her employer thinks she should, and a man who is attempt-
ing to change his sex and appearance to be a woman. Such drastic action
cannot be fairly characterized as a mere failure to conform to stereo-
types .... This disorder is not meant to describe a child's nonconformity
to stereotypic sex-role behavior as, for example, in 'tomboyishness' in
girls or 'sissyish' behavior in boys. Rather, it represents a profound dis-
turbance of the individual's sense of identity with regard to maleness or
femaleness."7 °
Other decisions have also refused to apply the prohibition of dis-
crimination based on gender stereotypes to transgender individuals.
In Broadus v. State Farm Insurance Co., the court stated that " [s] exual
stereotyping which plays a role in an employment decision is action-
able under Title VII."' However, the court refused to extend the
protection of Price Waterhouse to transsexuals as "[i]t is un-
clear... whether a transsexual is protected from sex discrimination
and sexual harassment under Title VII. 7 2 The court essentially dic-
tated that transgender individuals, unlike biological males and fe-
Etsitty, 2005 WIL 1505610 at *6 ("[A] complete rejection of sex-related conventions was
never contemplated by the drafters of Tite VII and is not required by the language of the stat-
ute or the Supreme Court opinion in Price Waterhouse.").
Id. (citing Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003)) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
70 Id. at *5 (citing DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 564). But see Doe v. United Consumer Fin.
Servs., No. 1:01CV1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 09, 2001) (holding that a
transsexual employee may have a claim for discrimination based on gender stereotyping under
Price Waterhouse, even though she did not have a claim under Title VII).
71 No. 98-4254CVCSOWECF, 2000 WL 1585257, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)); see also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No.
Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (refusing to hold that the
discrimination was due to gender stereotypes, but rather that the plaintiff was fired because
"[he] disguised himself as a person of a different sex and presented himself as a female for
stress relief and to express his gender identity").
72 Broadus, 2000 WL 1585257, at *4.
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males who identify with the gender with which they are born, are be-
low protection for failing to meet a sexual stereotype.7
Notable decisions have rationalized the disparate treatment of the
transgender community by emphasizing congressional intent in the1 . •74
formulization of anti-discrimination laws. These courts propound
that Congress intended to limit protection to members of either gen-
der, and did not purposefully include groups whose gender identity
surpasses traditional conceptions.75
The disinclination of the courts to provide equal protection for
the transgender community is not improper in light of federal statu-
tory authority, which is notably averse to providing equal rights and
protection against discrimination for transgender individuals. Con-
gress specifically excluded the transgender community from the
ADA 76 and the Rehabilitation Act.
77
The court in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. noted that from
1981 through 2001, thirty-one proposed bills were introduced in the
United States Senate and the House of Representatives that at-
tempted to amend Title VII to prohibit employment discrimination
on the basis of affectional or sexual orientation.78  None of these
measures passed. The rejection of these proposed amendments indi-
cates that Congress intended the phrase in Title VII prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of sex to be narrowly interpreted.79
7' Other decisions refusing to extend Price Waterhouse to transsexuals include Etsitty, 2005 WL
1505610, at *3 (finding that statutory construction prohibited transgendered plaintiffs from
receiving protections under Title VII), and Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541, at *6 (finding that plain-
tiff's actions were not like the actions of the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse because the plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse simply did not act as her employer thought she should have; she never pre-
tended to be a man or adopted a masculine persona).
" See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that it is
the court's responsibility "to interpret.., congressional legislation and determine what Con-
gress intended when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex" and thereafter holding
that transsexuals were not meant to be protected under Title VII).
15 See Plakio v. Congregational Home, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1383, 1389-90 (D. Kan. 1995)
(holding that, in the context of Title VII's prohibition against discrimination, "sex" means
membership in class delineated by gender; it does not mean sexual orientation, preference,
identity, affiliation, or behavior); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that "sex," as used in Title VII, refers to an individual's distinguishing
biological or anatomical characteristics, whereas "gender" refers to an individual's sexual iden-
tity).
76 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
" 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (F) (i) (2000).
78 2002 WL 31098541, at *4 n.53 (listing each of the thirty-one proposed bills that were un-
successfully introduced).
However, it is notable that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that same-sex sexual dis-
crimination is actionable under Title VII. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75, 78
(1998) (refusing to exclude same-sex sexual harassment from Title VII protection). This belies
that the Court's interpretation of what constitutes sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII will
always be narrowly drawn based on conventional conceptions of gender relationships.
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Despite the reluctance of Congress and many courts to recognize
protection for the transgender community, there have been favorable
developments. The Ninth Circuit, in dicta, has recognized that "sex"
and "gender" are both protected under Title VII, thus enabling fed-
eral jurisprudence to recognize that discrimination can span beyond
mere unfavorable treatment due to one's biological gender.0
In Schwenk v. Hartford, the defendant, a prison guard accused of
sexually assaulting a transgender inmate, claimed that transsexualism
is not an element of gender, but rather constitutes gender dysphoria,
a psychiatric illness.81 The court disagreed and stressed that the Gen-
der Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), which parallels Title VII, pro-
hibits discrimination based on gender as well as sex. "Indeed, for
purposes of these two acts, the terms 'sex' and 'gender' have become
interchangeable. 82 The court held that the GMVA applied to trans-
sexuals because the Act expressly stated that it protected "all persons
within the United States. 83
One of the most important victories for transgender equality was
achieved in the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins.4 This influential decision shed light on the fact that gender
categories are not as distinct as traditionally conceived. The Court
held that gender stereotypes, such as requiring that a woman wear
heels and make-up, are sex discrimination under Title VII. s5 The
presence or absence of anatomy typically associated with a particular
sex cannot itself form the basis of a legitimate employment decision
unless the possession of that anatomy is a bona fide occupational
qualification.86
Although the specific facts of the case did not include transgender
parties, it is not surprising that Price Waterhouse would provide protec-
See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that "under
Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences
between men and women-and gender. Discrimination because one fails to act in the way ex-
pected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII."); see also Dominguez-Curry v. Nev.
Transp. Dep't, 424 F.3d 1027, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (limiting employer defenses under amend-
ments to Title VII, whereby an employer can no longer escape liability by merely showing moti-
vations besides sex for discrimination).
" 204 F.3d at 1200.
82 Id. at 1202.
,3 Id. at 1200 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (2000) (prohibiting "crime[s] of violence com-
mitted because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus
based on the victim's gender"). Whether a particular act of violence was gender-motivated and
thus fell within the Act's scope is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances. The
GMVA has since been declared unconstitutional by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-
18 (2000), because it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
85 See id. at 251 ("[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group ...
* Id. at 244.
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tion, even if only implicitly, for such individuals. Discrimination
against transgender individuals is based on:
stereotypes about how men and women are "supposed" to behave and
about how male and female bodies are "supposed" to appear. For the
most part, in other words, anti-transgender discrimination is not a new or
unique form of bias, but rather falls squarely within the parameters of
discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and/or disability.7
Accordingly, cases subsequent to Price Waterhouse have held that it
overrules precedent abridging transgender rights."" Smith v. City of Sa-
lem held that Price Waterhouse implicitly overrules cases like Holloway,
Ulane, and Sommers.s9 Smith importantly recognized the inability of
the biological definitions of sex to capture the spectrum of sex-
stereotypes, and thus held that "discrimination because of 'sex' in-
cludes gender discrimination .... 90 According to Thomas Ling:
The court concluded that the source of contra-gender behavior
was... irrelevant to a Title VII inquiry. It rejected the use of labels such
as transsexual, homosexual, or transvestite to deny protections to trans-
gender individuals under Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. Thus,
Smith's transsexual identity did not affect his well-pleaded claims of sex-
stereotyping and gender discrimination. 9'
Ling argues that Title VII should protect transgender individuals
because
biology provides little insight into the boundaries of sex discrimination.
Plaintiffs can only rarely claim discrimination on the basis of actual body
parts .... By suggesting that Title VII protections only prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of biological sex, courts seem to ignore Congress's in-
tent to prohibit "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.
92
Other recent federal case law has explicitly held that "sex" dis-
crimination spans beyond clear cut categories of unfavorable treat-
ment of females by males.93 Some federal jurisprudence has even
87 Abigail W. Lloyd, Comment, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the
Law, 20 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. &JuST. 150, 153 (2005) (citing Currah & Minter, supra note 5,
at 38-39).
m See generally Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (arguing, implicitly,
that Price Waterhouse overruled previous cases). Notably, Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No.
2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *4 (D. Utah lune 24, 2005), which is post-Price Waterhouse,
rejected the idea that the latter case called for a protection of transgender rights.
Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
I !d.
' Thomas Ling, Smith v. City of Salem: Title VII Protects Contra-Gender Behavior, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 280 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 280-81 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)) (citations
omitted).
" See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998) (holding that
same sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII); Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294
F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the school's policy of allowing a transgender male
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gone as far as acknowledging that transgender individuals are pro-
tected under federal civil rights statutes.94
Despite these fortuitous decisions, federal case law has not univer-
sally embraced a protective stance with respect to the transgender
community. The same dichotomy is evident in state jurisprudence.
B. State Law Status of Transgender Rights
States that have handled the issue of gender identity discrimina-
tion have varied in their approach to analyzing whether it constitutes
sex discrimination.
There has been favorable precedent in various states acknowledg-
ing the civil rights of transgender individuals.5 New York has been at
the forefront of the movement toward judicial recognition of trans-
gender equality. The state's jurisprudential response to the newly
adopted broad language in New York City's anti-discrimination
amendment of 2002 shed light on the courts' willingness to protect
transgender rights given sufficient statutory authority.
In McGrath v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., the New York Court of Appeals,
commenting on the adoption of the 2002 amendment, remarked that
to use the women's faculty restroom did not create a hostile work environment); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 (1st Cir. 1999) (declaring that standards of liabil-
ity under Title VII apply to same-sex plaintiffs just as they do to opposite-sex plaintiffs. A man
can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not
meet stereotypical expectations of masculinity.); Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No.
Civ.02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *10 (D. Ariz. June 03, 2004) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiff's Title VII and Title IX claims because there was
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was denied bathroom access based on her gender identity);
Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (recognizing
that the Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination based on sex identity); Tanner
v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that Title VII
protects all persons, whether male or female, heterosexual or homosexual, from discrimination
based on sex).
94 See generally Smith, 378 F.3d at 572-73 (acknowledging protection under Title VII);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing protection under the
GMVA); Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL
22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (upholding a claim under Title VII); Miles v. N.Y.
Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (acknowledging discrimination protection un-
der Title IX).
95 See, e.g., Lie v. Sky Publ'g Corp., No. 0131171, 2002 WL 31492397, at *8-9 (Mass. Supp.
Oct. 7, 2002) (finding a prima facie case of sex discrimination when a transgender woman was
forced to wear men's clothing); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 79-81 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a state statute that made it illegal "for any person to appear on any public
street, sidewalk, alley, or other public thoroughfare dressed with the designed intent to disguise
his or her true sex as that of the opposite sex," as an interference with personal liberty rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment (citing HOUSTON, TEX., CODE § 28-42.4 (1980))); City of
Chicago v. Wilson, 75 N.E.2d 522, 523 (IIl. 1978) (holding unconstitutional a Chicago ordi-
nance that prohibited a person from wearing clothing of the opposite sex with intent to conceal
his or her biological gender).
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"the City Council determined that, in its view, the Code already pro-
tected transsexuals but was concerned that, without the amendment,
the law could be misinterpreted as excluding this class of individuals
from coverage. 96 Thus the court concluded that the new legislation
had merely "eras[ed] any doubt" on the matter. 7 This "was the first
public accommodation case that went to verdict under the New York
City Human Rights Law, and was the first judgment in favor of trans-
sexuals."9  The court described the decision, which held that the dis-
crimination case brought by three transsexuals served a significant
public purpose, as "a groundbreaking verdict [that] can educate the
public concerning substantive rights and increase awareness as to the
plight of a disadvantaged class."
Of perhaps even more importance is Judge Joan B. Lefkowitz's
Westchester County Supreme Court opinion in Buffong v. Castle on the
Hudson.'00 This very recent New York state court opinion was the first
time a New York state judge explicitly held that New York Human
Rights Law protects transgender individuals. The judge made it clear
that "[c] ase law supports the view that a transgendered person states
a claim pursuant to New York State's Human Rights Law on the
ground that the word 'sex' in the statute covers transsexuals." 10
New York's favorable treatment of transgender rights emerged
years prior to the 2002 amendment. In 1996, the Southern District of
New York declared transgender individuals a protected class under
New York's human rights law.' °2 The New York Supreme Court had
adopted the same protective interpretation of the state's human
rights law the year before in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.10 3 When a
transgender woman was subjected to a hostile work environment, the
court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim under the
New York City Human Rights Law's prohibition of gender discrimina-
tion in employment, despite the failure of the Code to expressly
cover transsexuals.0 4 The court stated that the contrary holdings of
the federal courts under Title VII were unduly restrictive and should
" 821 N.E.2d 519, 526-27 (N.Y. 2004).
97 Id. at 526.
98 Id. at 527.
Id.
No. 11634/05, 2005 WL 4658320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 2005).
Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).
102 Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
24, 1996) (noting that this does not necessarily mean that such individuals are protected under
federal law, such as Title VII, but stating that "'[t] here is nothing precluding a court of this state
from making a more expansive interpretation' of state law than that given to Title VII" (citing
Nicolo v. Citibank N.Y. State, N.A., 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990))).
113 626 N.Y.S.2d 391, 396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
id. at 394-95.
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not be followed in interpreting state and local statutes."°" The New
York City Commission on Human Rights had reached the same con-
clusion in administrative decisions.
1 0 6
New Jersey has also demonstrated judicial recognition of trans-
gender rights as early as 1976. In M. T. v. J. T., the New Jersey Su-
preme Court was asked to determine whether a transgender woman
was legally female for the purposes of marriage.1 °7 The case, which
was one of the first in the nation to recognize the validity of a trans-
gender marriage, relied heavily on both medical evidence document-
ing the procedures the woman had undergone as well as how long
she had lived as a female.
Like the New York anti-discrimination law, the New jersey civil
rights law has also been broadly interpreted. In Zalewski v. Overlook
Hospital, the court held that the New Jersey Law Against Discrimina-
tion applied to sexual harassment of a heterosexual male by other
heterosexual males when the harassment was based on gender stereo-
typing. ° 8 judge Menza noted that we should not "condone severe
sexual harassment of a person because he is perceived or presumed
to be less than someone's definition of masculine."10 9 In 2001, the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination was held to include protec-
tion of transgender individuals. The court in Enriquez v. West Jersey
Health Systems stated that:
It is incomprehensible to us that our Legislature would... condone dis-
crimination against men or women who seek to change their anatomical sex
because they suffer from a gender identity disorder. We conclude that sex
discrimination under the [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination] includes
gender discrimination so as to protect plaintiff from gender stereotyping and
discrimination for transforming herself from a man to a woman."'
Aside from the aforementioned examples of the New York and
New Jersey civil rights laws, a handful of other states have also pro-
vided legislative transgender protection. For example, in California,
105 Id.
06 See, e.g., Arroyo v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. EM01120-04-12-89-DE, 1994 WL
932424, at *5 (N.Y. City Comm'n Human Rights 1994) (acknowledging that a transsexual may
have a hostile work environment discrimination claim but dismissing the complaint in this case
because the supervisor was not adequately aware of the gender disorder of the complainant).
In furtherance of the dismissal of the discrimination claim, the administrative law judge stated
that the "[c]omplainant [failed to] cite any authority for the proposition that the general en-
forcement of sex-specific restrooms constitutes gender-based discrimination." Id.
0.7 See 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that after a person born
with the physical characteristics of a male underwent successful surgery to become a female,
and was thereafter physically and psychologically female, she was female for the purpose of
marriage).
692 A.2d 131, 132 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
,t Id. at 136.
... 777 A.2d 365, 373 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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the Poppink Act of 2000 clarified the disability coverage of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act and explicitly eliminated the ADA
gender and transsexuality exclusions."'
Approximately eighty-four cities and a number of counties have
also enacted ordinances protecting the rights of transgender peo-
ple."12 However, local ordinances that prohibit transgender discrimi-
nation do not ultimately carry much weight in the courts since state
laws trump local ones.
New York is exemplary in that the state's courts are willing to
stretch explicit legislative language to protect transgender rights.
However, the absence of such language often makes it simple to deny
these rights, as is evident in the federal decisions construing Title VII.
It is then undeniable that statutory protection is fundamentally im-
portant in order to make lasting inroads in the battle for transgender
equality.
Despite the gains in transgender protection in the United States,
not all states have been so receptive and progressive. Moreover,
states such as New York have not been consistent in protecting trans-
gender rights.
One of the most damaging recent decisions came from Minnesota
in 2001. In Goins v. West Group, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court
concluded that the defendants' designation of restroom use on the
basis of "biological gender," rather than biological self-image, was not
discrimination.13 The court incorporated the lower district court's
analysis that the plaintiff was not to be permitted to use the women's
facilities because "[i]n significant ways she is functionally different
than females with respect to the most common objective criteria re-
lated to bathroom use. "" 4 Similarly, the lower district court found
that the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim failed because
"West's policy was reasonable and did not rise to a sufficiently perva-
sive level of harassment. ,5 The Supreme Court agreed with West
that restroom use can be designated based on "biological gender" not
because of any statutory authority but because of "cultural prefer-
ence."" 6 The court decided that, "where financially feasible, the tra-
ditional and accepted practice in the employment setting is to pro-
vide restroom facilities that reflect the cultural preference for
... CAL. GOV'TCODE § 12926(1) (2005).
112 See Transgender Law & Policy Inst., supra note 8 (providing an updated list ofjurisdictions
with transgender-protective laws).
,' 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001).
14 Jenifer M. Ross-Amato, Transgender Employees & Bathroom Destination--Goins v. West
Group, Inc., 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 569, 573 (2002) (citing Goins v. West Group, Inc., No.
98-18222, slip op. at 10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 14, 2000)).
15 Id.
C' Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723.
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restroom designation based on biological gender.".. The court
stated that the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) only protects
"[the plaintiffs] right to be provided an adequate and sanitary rest-
room," and not complete discretion as to bathroom choice."
8
However, Minnesota's human rights statute indicates that protec-
tion for transgender individuals may be permissible under the MHRA
and thus the allegation in Goins should be considered a violation of
the Act." 9 The language of the MHRA encompasses transgender in-
dividuals and provides that the definition of "sexual orientation" in-
cludes "having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity
not traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or female-
ness.
The Coins holding has even had an impact in New York, where the
2002 amendment to the New York City anti-discrimination law should
have protected transgender individuals. This result is not unprece-
dented given the Minnesota court's circumvention of the broad lan-
guage of the MHRA. In Hispanic Aids Forum v. Estate of Bruno, the
court agreed with the reasoning and holding in Goins by refusing to
hold that denying bathroom access based on gender identity consti-
tuted sex discrimination under New York civil rights statutes.12 1 In
Bruno, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to execute a
lease renewal because the plaintiffs transgender clients were using
the common area restrooms that did not coincide with their biologi-
cal sex and that the other tenants in the building were complaining.
"[T] he only discernible claim set forth in the complaint is that plain-
tiff's transgender clients were prohibited from using the restrooms
not in conformance with their biological sex, as were all tenants.'
However, the court stated that if the allegations with respect to the
building's other common areas were correct, the trans ender indi-
viduals may have a claim for violations of their civil rights.T.
Judge Saxe's sole dissent noted that
[t]his puzzling ruling, in effect, amounts to the preemptive issuance of
an advisory opinion on a question not yet before the court, a question
which might not necessarily be presented at all in this litiga-
tion.., whether it constitutes discrimination when a transgender indi-
117 It
11 Id. at 723 n.2.
MINN. STAT. § 363A04(1) (2005); MINN. STAT. § 363.A08(2) (2004).
Coins, 635 N.W.2d at 722 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.A03(44) (2005)).
2 Hispanic Aids Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
l Id. at 47.
121 See id. ("Inasmuch as plaintiff makes vague allusions to a connection between defendants'
refusal to renew the lease and plaintiffs refusal to prohibit its transgender clients from using
the building's common areas, including the main entrance, we grant leave to replead if plaintiff
chooses to pursue those assertions with an adequate degree of specificity.").
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vidual is prevented from using the restroom corresponding with his or
her adopted gender.
24
Other states have also demonstrated an unwillingness to recognize
transgender rights.125 The denial of transgender rights has been par-
ticularly evident in the context of marriage. The dismissal of the as-
sertion that even post-operative transgender individuals are members
of the gender with which they identify indicates the judicial reluc-
tance to protect the transgender community simply because they are
"transgender," as opposed to biological males or females who adopt
the characteristics of the opposite gender.
In the case of In re Estate of Gardiner, the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that a post-operative male-to-female transsexual is not a woman
within the meaning of the state statutes recognizing marriage, and a
marriage between a post-operative male-to-female transsexual and a
man is void as against public policy. 2 6 The court expressly stated that
"It] he words 'sex,' 'male,' and 'female' in everyday understanding do
not encompass transsexuals.' ' 7 This reasoning has been followed in
other state court decisions. In Kantaras v. Kantaras, the District Court
of Appeals of Florida held that, as a matter of first impression, the law
does not provide for or allow a post-operative female-to-male trans-
sexual person to marry a female and any marriage that is not between
persons of the opposite sex, as determined by their biological sex at
birth, will be invalidated: "We agree with the Kansas, Ohio, and
Texas courts in their understanding of the common meaning of male
and female, as those terms are used statutorily, to refer to immutable
traits determined at birth.'2 8 In the case of In re Ladrach, the Ohio
court found that a post-operative male-to-female transsexual was not
permitted to marry a male since one's "true sex" is determined at
birth.'2 "[T]here is no authority in Ohio for the issuance of a mar-
riage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative
124 Id. at 48 (Saxe,.|., dissenting).
12 See Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) (deciding
that discharging plaintiff on the basis of transsexualism does not violate the District of Colum-
bia Human Rights Act because the District's Commission on Human Rights had defined the
term to mean the state of being male or female and the conditions associated therewith);.lane
Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993) (holding that gender dysphoria is not a pro-
tected handicap under the state anti-discrimination law); K. v. Health Div., Dep't of Human
Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Or. 1977) (endorsing the view that a "'birth certificate' is an histori-
cal record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth," rather than "a record of facts as they
presently exist," and refusing to issue a new birth certificate for a female-to-male transsexual).
' See 42 P.3d 120, 137 (Kan. 2002) (denying inheritance rights to male-to-female transsexual
wife of intestate decedent).
In Id. at 135.
12 884 So. 2d 155, 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
I 513 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
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male to female transsexual person and a male person."'13 More re-
cently, an Ohio appellate court agreed with the decision in Ladrach
and affirmed a trial court's denial of a marriage license to a post-
operative female-to-male transsexual and a female. 3 ' The court con-
cluded that the term "male" as used in the marriage statute does not
include a female-to-male post-operative transsexual.'
32
Similarly, in Littleton v. Prange, the Court of Appeals of Texas held
that marriage between a man and a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual was not valid, and thus the transsexual lacked standing to
bring a claim as the man's surviving spouse under wrongful death
and survival statutes.3 3 The Littleton court noted that transsexuals still
"inhabit[] ... a male body in all aspects other than what the physi-
cians have supplied.',
3 4
Moreover, several states' laws, much like the ADA, have excluded
transsexuals from disability protection. These include Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. 3 5 As of
the date this Comment was written, there are only four states that ex-
plicitly protect transgender people in employment. 3 6  California is
the only state that explicitly protects transgender and gender non-
conforming students from discrimination and harassment.3 7 There
"o Id. at 832.
In reA Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095, at
*5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
'12 Id. at *6.
9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
"3 Id.
... See SHANNON MINTER, REPRESENTING TRANSSEXUAL CLIENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED
LEGAL ISSUES (2003), http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/translaw.htm (listing states
denying disability protection for transgender individuals).
'3 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (2005) ("It is hereby declared as the public policy of this state
that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek,
obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of race, reli-
gious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condi-
tion, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation."); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03(44), 363A.04(2)
(2005) (prohibiting "discrimination because of... sexual orientation" which "means...
[among other definitions] having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not tra-
ditionally associated with one's biological maleness or femaleness"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-
2(Q) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) ("'[G]ender identity' means a person's self-perception, or per-
ception of that person by another, of the person's identity as a male or female based upon the
person's appearance, behavior or physical characteristics that are in accord with or opposed to
the person's physical anatomy, chromosomal sex or sex at birth."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2.1 ()
(2006) ("'Gender identity or expression' includes a person's actual or perceived gender, as well
as a person's gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-related appearance, or gender-
related expression, whether or not that gender identity, gender-related self image, gender-
related appearance, or gender-related expression is different from that traditionally associated
with the person's sex at birth.").
137 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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are no laws that protect transgender people from discrimination in
health care.138
Despite the dearth of state statutory protection for transgender
individuals, the issue of transgender rights is achieving recognition in
public discourse, and grassroots initiatives are proving incrementally
successful in this effort.
C. Recent Developments in Transgender Protection
Transgender individuals may very well be considered the last fron-
tier of groups facing open and often unopposed discrimination. A
2002 survey conducted by the San Francisco Human Rights Commis-
sion indicated that nearly half of all transgender respondents re-
ported having been harassed or assaulted in public restrooms. 39
Like for many such groups in the past, the larger victory of equal-
ity often follows long fought battles by a few champions of these
rights. The efforts are also slow to yield results because the majority
is reluctant to make concessions or to even recognize that the prob-
lem exists. The few champions that do exist in the battle for trans-
gender rights, however, have been very active and at least somewhat
successful in their efforts. For example, the San Francisco-based ad-
vocacy group, People in Search of Safe Restrooms, has been at the
forefront of the battle for transgender rights. 40 Aside from the initia-
tives of such advocacy groups, one of the other most formidable re-
cent developments are the numerous movements on college cam-
puses lobbing for equal protection for the transgender
community.'
4 '
Ordinances in New York City and San Francisco have officially
protected the transgender community by broadening sex discrimina-
tion to include discrimination based on gender identity. As discussed
above, New York City passed an amendment strengthening its anti-
discrimination law to prohibit discrimination against individuals
'" See Vade, supra note 38, at 260 (describing the deficiency in transgender-protective laws).
139 SeeJAMISON GREEN, HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., INVESTIGATION INTO
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE 43 (1994), http://
www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfhumanrights/docs/tgreport.pdf (addressing the absence
of laws facilitating redress of discrimination against transgendered individuals).
'0 See generally People in Search of Safe Restrooms, http://www.pissr.org/aboutus.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2006) (underscoring its commitment to establishing gender-neutral bath-
rooms).
... See, e.g., Brett Genny Beemyn, Making Campuses More Inclusive of Transgender Students, 3J.
GAY & LESBIAN ISSUES EDUC. 77, 80-86 (2005) (describing needs of transgender students and
recommending steps for accommodating these needs by universities); Fred A. Bernstein, On
Campus, Rethinking Biology 101, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, § 9, at 1 (detailing efforts of trans-
gender students to obtain gender neutral facilities such as restrooms and locker-rooms and
highlighting progress made at Brown, Sarah Lawrence, and Wesleyan Universities).
Feb. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA[o W
based on "gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or ex-
pression... [whether or not it] is different from that traditionally as-
sociated with the legal sex assigned to that person at birth."'' 41 San
Francisco has adopted similar regulations.
143
New York City's Board of Health also announced in early Novem-
ber 2006 that it is contemplating a much-lauded policy change of
permitting transsexuals to change the gender on their birth certifi-
cates without first undergoing gender reassignment surgery. 44 The
measure, which is likely to be approved, would only require that an
individual has lived as one of his or her adopted gender for at least
two years, and there are no other medical requirements. This is a
tremendous boon to those in the transgender community who could
not or would not undergo surgery, but who wished to use photo iden-
tification that is consistent with the gender with which they identify.
Enabling a change in one's gender on a birth certificate permits one
to obtain a passport, driver's license, and other government identifi-
cation with that designated gender. This would solve the problem
many have when presenting identification that states one's gender
inconsistently with the way one presents him or herself.
Yet transgender individuals are still "[s]trangers to the [ 5]aw.'5
Despite these positive developments, it is crucial that this group is
recognized as a suspect class for purposes of nation-wide equal rights
protection. The battle for bathroom access based on gender identity
would be most efficiently and effectively waged in such a legal envi-
ronment.
IV. THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF BATHROOM ACCESS
A. The Necessity of Declaring Discriminatory the Denial of Bathroom Access
Based on Bona Fide Gender Identity
Given the often blatant discrimination faced by the transgender
community on a daily basis, uniform national protective legislation is
both an unlikely and overly ambitious goal. "Transgender people
face severe discrimination in virtually every aspect of social life-in
employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, marriage,
parenting and law enforcement," 46 and much of this discriminatory
treatment is fueled by ignorance of what it means to be transgender
142 N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CODE § 8-102(23) (2005) (amended Apr. 30, 2002).
141 See, e.g., S.F., CAL., CODE §§ 12A, 12B, 12C (2006) (broadening the definition of gender
discrimination); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33 (2006) (addressing gender discrimination).
14 Damien Cave, New York Plans to Make Gender Personal Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at
A1.Al Lloyd, supra note 86, at 150.
'4 Currah & Minter, supra note 5, at 37-38.
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and how accommodating the needs of this community may compro-
mise others in the sexual majority. Reform will probably be achieved
gradually and should be targeted to areas where the transgender in-
dividual's rights are most compromised before universal acceptance
and equality is achieved. The problem of bathroom access based on
gender identity is both a natural and effective place to begin the bat-
tle for equality, compassion, and understanding of the transgender
community.
As the discrimination faced by the transgendered is often intrinsi-
cally tied to their gender, which bathroom to use is a fundamental
and unnecessarily complicated choice that highlights the discord be-
tween the transgender individual's personal identity and society's la-
bel of what is acceptable. By tackling this isolated issue and permit-
ting bathroom access based on gender identity, society will not only
accommodate the needs of the transgendered, and thus permit them
the same privileges of personal comfort and dignity afforded the ma-
jority, but will also permit a gradual acclimation and acceptance by
the mainstream to the transgender community.
There is a variety of safety, comfort, and equality implications for
permitting bathroom and facility access based on gender identity.,
For transgender youth, for instance, placement in a gender-specific
facility can mean being forced to share sleeping quarters and bath-
rooms with members of their biological gender, which can have con-
sequences ranging from humiliation to sexual assault. 48 Undeniably,
assault on transgender individuals while using bathrooms designated
for those of the opposite biological gender is more common than
may be presumed. r4r However, if protection is statutorily mandated,
the transgendered not only have a layer of protection against unjust
arrest and harassment, but also a possible hate crime claim including
an avenue for sentence elevation based on aggravating circum-
stances.150
It is therefore critical that the transgender community be permit-
ted to use bathrooms designated for the gender with which they iden-
tify. Since gender conforming individuals, no matter their sexual
147 See generally Lloyd, supra note 86, at 154 (discussing the trouble transgender people have
in ensuring courts, and other segments of society, recognize their injuries and their rights)... See Anne Tamar-Mattis, Comment, Implications of AB 458for California LGBTQ Youth in Fos-
ter Care, 14 LAw & SEXUALITY REv. 149, 159 (2005) (discussing problems faced by transgender
youth in foster care when they are not permitted to use facilities designated for those of the
gender with which they identify). '
149 See Patricia Leigh Brown, A Quest for a Restroom That's Neither Men's Room Nor Women's Room,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A14 (detailing assault on transgender individuals due to use of
women's restroom).
,0 See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore, Transgender Group Reaches Agreement on Restrooms, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2005, at B3 (detailing arrest and acquittal of transgender individual after passage of the
broad language constituting gender discrimination to the New York City civil rights law).
Feb. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
orientation, can simply use the facilities designated for those of their
biological gender with whom they identify, the transgender individ-
ual will only achieve true equality once he or she is permitted the
same liberty and personal dignity.
B. Bathroom Access as Fundamental Indicator of Equality for Transgender
Individuals
The issue of bathroom access is paramount to the fight for equal-
ity by the transgender community, and this assertion is bolstered by
the fact that many cases dealing with transgender equal protection
have been in the context of bathroom access. However, although ob-
vious strides have been made in the battle for transgender rights,
when judicial decisions concerned bathroom access for preoperative
transsexuals, both state and federal courts have overwhelmingly de-
nied protection. 15  Indeed, the cases dealing with a transgender
plaintiffs discharge for wearing inappropriate attire are often moti-
vated by bathroom access issues. 52 For instance, in Boeing, the court
held that gender dysphoria is not a protected handicap under anti-
discrimination law and, moreover, that the plaintiff transsexual was
fired for wearing gender-inappropriate attire as opposed to for being
a transsexual. 5 3 The court emphasized that this was particularly im-
portant as the plaintiff may have used the male restroom. The court
stated that "Doe was told her attire would be deemed unacceptable
151 See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 748-49 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that
the transgender individual's use of women's restroom led to disruption and refusing to hold
that the transgendered are a protected group for purposes of Titie VII); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Title VII does not protect from
discrimination against transsexuals as it bars discrimination based on "sex" and not "gender"
and citing employer affidavit that the transgender individual's use of men's restroom caused
"personnel problems"); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at
*3 (D. Utah.june 24, 2005) (holding that dismissal of preoperative male to female transsexual
was permissible because of the employer's concern about complaints due to her using female
restrooms);.Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 999 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding
that discharge of pre-surgical transsexual woman who was fired after she refused to use men's
restroom did not amount to a violation of Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act); Do-
bre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that the
transgender community is not a protected class under Title VII in claim instigated by an em-
ployer who forbade transgender plaintiff from using women's restroom); Coins v. West Group,
Inc., 635 N.W.2d 717, 723 (Minn. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff was not to be permitted to
use the women's facilities because she was not a biological female); Hispanic Aids Forum v. Es-
tate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (agreeing with the reasoning and hold-
ing in Goins and refusing to hold that denying bathroom access based on gender identity consti-
tuted sex discrimination under New York civil fights statutes).
.5 See Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and.Judicial Identity,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 329, 367 (1999) (discussing.Jane Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536
(Wash. 1993), in which bathroom access issues played a factor in the court's decision).
.Jane Doe, 846 P.2d at 536 ("Boeing discharged Doe because she violated Boeing's direc-
tives on acceptable attire, not because she was gender dysphoric.").
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when, in the supervisor's opinion, her dress would be likely to cause a
complaint were Doe to use a men's rest room at a Boeing facility.'
54
In both Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. and Sommers v. Budget Mar-
keting, Inc., disruption created by a transsexual's bathroom use was
cited by the employer as a reason for termination.1
55
Even when discrimination is present, defendants often escape un-
scathed by simply demonstrating merely perfunctory consideration of
the transgender plaintiffs rights. For instance, in Doe v. City of Min-
neapolis, a biological female identifying as male and in the process of
becoming one through hormone therapy claimed that he was dis-
charged from his job with the police department when he was as-
signed to a shift in which no unisex bathroom was available. 15 6 He
brought suit against the city, alleging sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act. The court held for the defendants in light of the
fact that city officials held numerous meetings on the issues raised by
having a transgender employee and that they sought guidance from
the department of human rights as to how best to respond to the
plaintiffs requests regarding bathroom and locker room facilities.
Thus, the court found that there was no evidence that the city will-
fully or maliciously violated the plaintiffs rights. 7
There have been exceptions to this reluctance to grant bathroom
access based on gender identity, but they have been few. For exam-
ple, in Cruzan, the court held that the school's policy of allowing a
transgender male to use the women's faculty restroom did not create
a hostile work environment. 58 The court reasoned that the school
district's policy was not directed at the female teacher who asserted
the claim; the teacher had convenient access to numerous restrooms
other than the women's faculty restroom, and the plaintiff did not
engage in any inappropriate conduct other than merely being pre-
sent in the women's faculty restroom.15
There are numerous reasons for the obstinacy to furnish bath-
room access based on gender identity. As the court said in Etsitty,
' Id. at 533-34.
'5 Sommers, 667 F.2d at 748-49; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.1; see also Dobre, 850 F. Supp. at
286 (noting that plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual, was forbidden by her employer from
using the women's restroom). But see Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty Coll. Dist., No. Civ.02-
1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *9-10 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (denying Defendant's Mo-
tion to Dismiss with respect to transsexual plaintiff's Title VII and Title IX claims because there
was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff was denied bathroom access based on her gender iden-
tity).
I Doe v. City of Minneapolis, No. C2-02-817, 2002 WL 31819236, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec.
17, 2002).
.57 Id.
" Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981,982 (8th Cir. 2002).
... Id. at 984.
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"[c]oncerns about privacy, safety and propriety are the reason that
gender specific restrooms are universally accepted in our society."16 °
Notably, the reasoning of the court in Cruzan v. Special School District
No. 1, one of the few exceptions to the courts' reluctance to provide
bathroom access based on gender identity, was marked by the dis-
missal of the unrealized fear that such designation of bathroom use
would result in disruption. 161
Many individuals express their discomfort in sharing a restroom
with a transgender person as fear, which likely stems from stereotypes
linking transgender people with sexual predators.161 Such an associa-
tion is even asserted by the ADA. In a provision specifically excluding
certain individuals from coverage, the Act includes "transvestism,
transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual
behavior disorders." 63 However, this fear is misplaced because there
is no evidence that transgender individuals are more likely to be sex-
ual predators than the general population, and such criminal activity
can be accomplished without permissive bathroom-access laws. 64
There are solutions to quell the fear of facilitating the acts of sex-
ual predators by permitting bathroom access based on gender iden-
tity. When the Minnesota legislature considered the 1993 amend-
ment to the MHRA, discussed in Goins, critics voiced fears that a law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would
sanction the actions of sexual predators.' 65 "To dissuade those fears,
the legislature adopted an amendment to the definition of 'sexual
orientation' excluding 'a physical or sexual attachment to children by
an adult.' 16 6 The legislature therefore recognized that sexual mis-
conduct is not necessarily associated with sexual orientation, and was
never intended to be approved by the legislature.
6 7
'w Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616 DS, 2005 WL 1505610, at *7 (D. Utah June
24, 2005).
'6' In Cruzan, the court indicated that the fears of using a bathroom with a transsexual are
unfounded when there are no actual allegations of abuse supporting them. See Ross-Amato,
supra note 113, at 584 (discussing Cruzan, 294 F.3d at 984).
'62 See Keller, supra note 151, at 369 (discussing misconceptions about the transgender com-
munity which often incite discrimination).
65 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
See DELANO GARVEY, SEXUAL VILLAINY: A SEX OFFENDER PROFILE,
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6027/research.htm (describing the typical sex
offender as a single middle-aged Caucasian male who is unlikely to report a history of mental
illness).
10 See Ross-Amato, supra note 113, at 582-83 (discussing legislative history of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act).
'6 Id. at 583 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.01(41)(a) (2000)).
167 id.
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People unwilling to share a restroom with a transgender person
may also express their fear as a loss of privacy, but multi-user rest-
rooms are not aplace where individuals typically have a high expecta-
tion of privacy. Notably, the comfort of one gender in the presence
of another was not sufficient to ban female journalists from male
locker rooms in the context of professional athletics. Privacy rights
are not compelling enough to survive violations of equal protection
and discrimination based on sex because the ends are not substan-
tially related to the means, as there are ways of preserving privacy
while still permitting female access. The need for female journalists
to do their jobs is by no means more compelling than the necessity
for transgender people to have bathroom access free from fear of
harassment, violence, and arrest. In the case of transgender bath-
room access, individuals still use private stalls and thus their privacy is
adequately protected.
1 7 0
The issue of bathroom access based on gender identity needs to
be addressed in more depth than it has received thus far due to its
fundamental importance to the fight for equality for the transgender
community. This is especially paramount since many of the cases ad-
dressing equal protection of those in the gender minority have in-
volved issues of bathroom access. As the effort for equality will no
doubt be gradual, reform will presumably come from the local level,
as it has up until this point, and should be modeled on the statutory
mandates in New York City and San Francisco.
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Local legislators should tailor regulations permitting bathroom
access based on gender identity modeled on the recent New York and
San Francisco ordinances, which have experienced notable success in
ameliorating discrimination and producing positive results for those
cities' transgender communities.
Both the New York City and San Francisco regulations are con-
structive models for their broad conception of "gender" and expan-
sive view of gender discrimination."' The City of San Francisco has
" See generally Keller, supra note 151, at 370 (noting that public or workplace restrooms are
intended to be shared, hence the limited expectation of privacy).
169 See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 96-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that female journal-
ists should be given access to male athletic locker rooms)." Furthermore, fear of sexual predators is not a sufficient reason to prohibit bathroom ac-
cess based on gender identity. Sexual predators will enter restrooms and other prohibited
places if they so choose, and the fact that they may do so legally if they identify as one of the
opposite biological gender will not make them more likely to commit violent crimes that are
themselves illegal.
... See N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CODE § 8-102(23) (2006) ("The term 'gender' shall include actual or
perceived sex and shall also include a person's gender identity, self-image, appearance, behav-
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also issued comprehensive guidelines, specifying that discrimination
on the basis of gender identity includes denying people access to
bathrooms, locker rooms, and housing appropriate to their gender
identity; deliberate misuse of pronouns; and, where there are gender-
specific dress codes, forcing transgender people to conform to dress
codes that are inappropriate to their gender identity.11
The 2002 amendment to the New York civil rights law specifies
that the term "gender" includes "actual or perceived sex and shall
also include a person's gender identity, self-image, appearance, be-
havior or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image,
appearance, behavior or expression is different from that tradition-
ally associated with the legal sex assigned to that person at birth."' 73
Accordingly, discrimination based on gender identity would be con-
sidered impermissible sex discrimination under New York law.
The broad conception of gender under New York law has not only
been proven effective in combating discrimination in the judicial
arena, but has also had groundbreaking practical implications in the
real world setting.14
A recent arrest and acquittal of a transgender individual made na-
tional news and proved a marker of the success accomplished
through the recent amendment.15 This event was not only indicative
of the power municipal legislation can have in influencing the na-
tional legal environment, but also underscored the daily battles
fought by the transgendered in everyday activities the majority takes
for granted, such as simply choosing a public restroom.
The battle for equal protection for transgender individuals is just
beginning, and some commentators believe that courtroom battles
are best waged "in favor of more palatable, easier cases such as dis-
crimination in the context of public accommodations, health care,
lending, recreational sport, prison, and the 'quasi-employment' con-
text where discrimination comes from some non-employer entity" as
opposed to "messy, controversial cases like the right of a transgender
ior or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or ex-
pression is different from that traditionally associated with the legal sex assigned to that person
at birth."); S.F., CAL., CODE §§ 12A, 12B, 12C (2006) (finding discrimination based on gender
identity "inimical to the public welfare"); S.F., CAL., S.F. POLICE CODE art. 33 (2006) ("It is the
policy of the City and County of San Francisco to eliminate discrimination based on... gender
identity... within the City and County.").
172 See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES TO PROHIBIT GENDER IDENTITY
DISCRIMINATION § 4 (2003), http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/sfhumanrights-page.aspid=6274.
'7' N.Y. CITY, N.Y., CODE § 8-102(23) (2006).
'74 See, e.g., McGrath v. Toys "R" Us Inc., 788 N.Y.S.2d 281, 288-89 (N.Y. 2004) (highlighting
the success of the fight for transgender rights due to the recent amendment).
'7' See Nicholas Confessore, Transgender Group Reaches Agreement on Restrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2005, at B3 (detailing acquittal of male to female transsexual for using women's restroom, in
light of the passage of the amendment to the City's civil rights law).
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person to use the bathroom of his of her choice.' 76 Although the
bathroom issue may be considered frivolous by some, its paramount
importance to the battle for transgender equality and inherent pres-
ence in many cases involving transgender rights is undeniable. Thus
the issue is simply unavoidable when discussing transgender dis-
crimination and must be handled accordingly.
The proposal for a third category of gender neutral facilities is not
the solution. The proper means of attaining transgender equality is
not to segregate the group into an extraneous "other" category, but
to treat transgender individuals as the majority is treated and to per-
mit each person bathroom access based on his or her gender identity.
Gender neutral bathroom access is both cost prohibitive and ig-
nores the underlying problem faced by transgender individuals with
respect to bathroom access. Individuals should be considered as
members of the gender group with which they identify and not as an
abnormal "other" denied recognition among existing societal groups.
Creating a third group of gender neutral bathrooms for transsexuals
only bolsters the assertion that such individuals do not "fit in."
Indeed, forcing the transgender plaintiff in Goins to use the gen-
der neutral bathroom was the catalyst for her claim against her em-
ployer. She was treated differently from other employees not because
of her biological gender, as the employer did not request proof of
this, but because her appearance was not consistent with her em-
ployer's notion of what was traditionally "female."'
Unisex itself is an instrument of discrimination. A gender neutral
bathroom "offers a stark example of what outsider status is like: if so-
ciety is composed only of those who enter the women's room and
those who enter the men's room, requiring someone to use a third
bathroom tells them they are outside society.
'
078
As most relevant statutes, including the MHRA and the New York
and San Francisco ordinances, do not categorize individuals but
rather provide a broad conception of gender identity, classification of
restrooms according to biology or sex is an unworkable standard for
restroom designation. These categories are too restrictive and im-
practical. "Self-selection of restroom use, based on outward appear-
ance and comfort level, is the only workable standard for restroom
designation.'
79
,' Lloyd, supra note 86, at 193.
... See Ross-Amato, supra note 113, at 596 (discussing traditional notions of gender identity).
'78 Keller, supra note 151, at 368.
" Ross-Amato, supra note 113, at 594-95.
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CONCLUSION
Bathroom access is an issue at the heart of the battle for trans-
gender rights. The traditional conception of gender as either male
or female is not only an oversimplification of reality; it fosters and
perpetuates discrimination against the gender minority who do not
fit the stereotypical mold. The New York and San Francisco ordi-
nances not only bespeak the variety of what constitutes "gender," but
also acknowledge that gender discrimination is not necessarily simply
unequal treatment of one gender by the other. These regulations
should be models for other municipal legislation. They illuminate
the battles faced by the transgender community in modern society,
and call for reform at the local level, which may very well influence
the national legal environment.
The battle for transgender rights is only at its inception, but such
legislation will no doubt facilitate further discussion and help build
on the numbered successes achieved thus far. The solution is not
segregating transgender individuals into a superfluous third category
of gender neutrality, but bestowing the same rights and privileges on
this group as are bestowed on others. It is only when the gender mi-
nority becomes incorporated into the mainstream that stereotypes
will be conquered and the goal of equal rights truly realized.
[Vol. 9:3
